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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of estimating the state of a linear time invariant system when some of its sensors and actuators are
compromised by an adversarial agent. In the model considered in this paper, the malicious agent attacks an input (output) by manipulating
its value arbitrarily, i.e., we impose no constraints (statistical or otherwise) on how control commands (sensor measurements) are changed
by the adversary. In the first part of this paper, we introduce the notion of sparse strong observability and we show that is a necessary
and sufficient condition for correctly reconstructing the state despite the considered attacks. In the second half of this work, we propose
an estimator to harness the complexity of this intrinsically combinatorial problem, by leveraging satisfiability modulo theory solving.
Numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our estimator.
Key words: Cyber-Physical Security, State Estimation, Security Monitoring
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are characterized by the tight
interconnection of cyber and physical components. CPS are
not only prone to actuator and sensor failures but also to
adversarial attacks on the control and sensing modules. Se-
curity of CPS is no longer restricted to the cyber domain,
and recent incidents such as the StuxNet malware [20] and
the security flaws reported on modern cars [13, 19] moti-
vated the recent interest in security of CPS, (see for ex-
ample, [1, 6, 26, 41] and references therein). During the last
decade, a number of security problems have been tackled by
the control community, e.g., denial-of-service [8,14,34,45],
replay attacks [27], man-in-the-middle attacks [40], false
data injection [25], etc.
This paper addresses the problem of state estimation when
several sensors and actuators are under attack. We broadly
refer to state estimation in the adversarial environment as
secure state estimation. Our attack model is quite general
and we impose no constraints on the magnitude, statistical
properties, or temporal characteristics of the signals manip-
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ulated by the adversary.
Secure state estimation has gained the attention of the con-
trol community over the past decade [12]. In one line of
work, the problem of state estimation and control under sen-
sor attacks is investigated and the authors derived necessary
and sufficient conditions under which estimation and stabi-
lization are possible [11]. Shoukry et. al. [36] further refined
this condition and called it sparse observability. Chong et.
al. [7] found an equivalent condition for continuous-time
systems and called it observability under attack. Nakahira et.
a. [29] investigated a similar problem while considering the
asymptotic correctness of state estimation. The authors re-
laxed the sparse observability condition to sparse detectabil-
ity and showed it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
asymptotic correctness. The noisy version of this problem
has been investigated in the literature [2,3,23,24,28]. Mishra
et. al. [23] derived the optimal solution for Gaussian noise.
In this paper, we solve the more general problem of actuator
and sensor attacks that includes, as a special case, sensors
attacks.
Under the sparse attack model in which an adversary can
only target a bounded number of actuators and sensors, state
estimation is intrinsically a combinatorial problem. Shoukry
et. al. [35] proposed a novel secure state estimator using
the Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) paradigm, called
IMHOTEP-SMT. The authors only considered attacks on
sensors. In this paper we address the more general problem
of sensor and actuator attacks and build an SMT-based es-
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timator that can correctly reconstruct the state under both
types of attacks.
In another line of work, the problem of secure state estima-
tion has been studied when the exact model of the system is
not available [30,43]. Tiwari et. al. [42] proposed an online
learning method by building so-called safety envelopes as
it receives attack-free data to detect abnormality in the data
when the system is prone to attacks. In [38, 39] the authors
considered system identification under sensors attacks. In
all of these works, the adversarial agent is restricted to only
attacking sensors.
Pasqualetti et. al. [31] investigated the problem of attack
detection and identification. The authors related the unde-
tectable and unidentifiable attacks to the zero-dynamics of
the underlying system. The proposed attack identification
mechanism consists of a number of fault-monitor filters that
provide formal guarantees for the existence of the attack.
The number of filters, however, grows exponentially with the
number of attacked sensors/actuators, and therefore hinders
scalability. In another work [33], the authors investigated
detectibility and identifiability of attacks in the presence of
disturbances and the concept of security index is generalized
to dynamical systems. The proposed method is inherently
combinatorial and does not scale well with the number of
attacked sensors and actuators. In this paper, by leveraging
the SMT paradigm, we design a state estimator that scales
well with the number of sensors and actuators.
Fault isolation and fault detection filters are classical control
topics closely related to secure state estimation. The tradi-
tional fault tolerant filters can detect faults on actuators and
sensors, however, they are not adequate for the purpose of
security. Some of these filters assume a priori knowledge
(statistical or temporal) of the fault signals [5], an assump-
tion that does not hold in the security framework. The clas-
sical fault detection filters [17] do not guarantee identifica-
tion of all possible adversarial signals and zero-dynamics
attacks remain stealthy. As an alternative approach, robusti-
fication has been used in order to estimate the state despite
sparse attacks by either deploying Kalman filters or prin-
ciple component analysis [10, 22]. The main drawback of
these methods is the absence of formal guarantees for the
correctness of the state. In contrast, the method proposed in
this paper is guaranteed to construct the state correctly in
spite of attacks on sensors and/or actuators if the number of
attacked components is below a specified threshold that de-
pends on the system. In a recent work [15], Harirchi et. al.
proposed a novel fault detection approach using techniques
from model invalidation. The authors pursued a worst-case
scenario approach and therefore their framework is suitable
for security. However, necessary and sufficient conditions
for state estimation in a general adversarial setting were not
investigated in [15]. In this paper, we precisely characterize
the class of systems, by providing necessary and sufficient
conditions, for which state reconstruction is possible despite
sensor and/or actuator attacks.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• We introduce the notion of sparse strong observability by
drawing inspiration from sparse observability [11,36] and
the classical notion of strong observablity [16]. We show
this is the relevant property when the adversarial agent
not only compromises sensor measurements but can also
attack inputs.
• We develop an observer by leveraging the SMT approach
to harness the exponential complexity of the problem.
Our observer consists of two blocks interacting iteratively
until the true state is found (see Section 4 for a detailed
explanation of the observer’s architecture).
• We propose two methods to further decrease the running
time of the proposed algorithm by reducing the number of
iterations of the observer. The first method exploits heuris-
tics that can be efficiently computed at each iteration. The
second method is inspired by the QUICKXPLAIN algo-
rithm [18] that efficiently finds an irreducibly inconsistent
set (see Section 4 for a detailed discussion on the afore-
mentioned methods). We demonstrate the scalability of
our proposed observer by several numerical simulations.
A preliminary version of some of the results in this paper
were presented in [37] where we introduced the notion of
sparse strong observability and drew the connection to se-
cure state estimation. However, the formal proofs were not
provided due to space limitations. Furthermore, we propose
a new observer that outperforms the observer introduced
in [37]. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces notation followed by the attack model and the precise
problem formulation. In Section 3, we introduce the notion
of sparse strong observability and relate this notion to the
problem of state reconstruction when some of the inputs
and outputs are under adversarial attacks. This section con-
cludes with the main theoretical contribution of this paper
that is Theorem 8. Section 4 is devoted to designing an ob-
server by exploiting the SMT paradigm. Section 5 provides
the simulation results followed by Section 6 that concludes
the paper.
2 Problem Definition
2.1 Notation
We denote the sets of real, natural and binary numbers by R,
N and B. We represent vectors and real numbers by lower-
case letters, such as u, x, y, and matrices with capital letters,
such as A. Given a vector x ∈ Rn and a set O⊆ {1, . . . ,n},
we use x|O to denote the vector obtained from x by remov-
ing all elements except those indexed by the set O. Sim-
ilarly, for a matrix C ∈ Rn1×n2 we use C|(O1,O2) to denote
the matrix obtained from C by eliminating all rows and
columns except the ones indexed by O1 and O2, respectively,
where Oi ⊆ {1, . . . ,ni} with ni ∈ N for i ∈ {1,2}. In order
to simplify the notation, we use C|(.,O2) := C|({1,...,n1},O2)
and C|(O1,.) := C|(O1,{1,...,n2}). We denote the complement
of O by O := {1, . . . ,n}\O. We use the notation {x(t)}T−1t=0
to denote the sequence x(0), . . . ,x(T −1), and we drop the
sub(super)scripts whenever it is clear from the context.
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A Linear Time Invariant (LTI) system is described by the
following equations:
x(t +1) = Ax(t)+Bu(t),
y(t) =Cx(t)+Du(t), (1)
where u(t) ∈ Rm, x(t) ∈ Rn and y(t) ∈ Rp are the input,
state and output variables, respectively, t ∈N∪{0} denotes
time, and A, B, C and D are system matrices with appro-
priate dimensions. We use (A,B,C,D) to denote the system
described by (1). The order of an LTI system is defined as
the dimension of its state space. A trajectory of the system
consists of an input sequence with its corresponding output
sequence. For an LTI system,
O(A,C) :=
[
CT ATCT . . . (AT )n−1CT
]T
, (2)
N(A,B,C,D) :=

D 0 . . . 0
CB D . . . 0
...
. . .
CAn−2B CAn−3B . . . D
 , (3)
are the observability and invertibility matrices, respectively,
where n is the order of the underlying system. In this pa-
per, we often work with subsets of inputs and outputs. For
a subset of outputs Γy ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, we use the notation
OΓy := O(A,C|(Γy,.)) to denote the observability matrix of out-
puts in the set Γy. For a set of inputs Γu ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, we
use the notation NΓu→Γy to denote N(A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)).
For x ∈ Rn, we define its support set as the set of indices
of its non-zero components, denoted by supp(x). Simi-
larity we define the support of the sequence {x(t)} as
supp({x(t)}) := ∩t supp(x(t)). The observer proposed in
this paper uses batches of inputs and outputs in order to re-
construct the state. We reserve capital bold letters to denote
these batches,
Yτ(t) :=
[
y(t− τ+1)T . . . y(t)T
]T
, (4)
Uτ(t) :=
[
u(t− τ+1)T . . . u(t)T
]T
, (5)
where τ ≤ n. Whenever τ is the order of the underlying
system, we may drop the superscript for ease of notation.
For a subset of outputs (inputs), denoted by Γy ⊆ {1, . . . , p}
(Γu ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}), we use the notation Yτ |Γy(t) (Uτ |Γu(t))
for the batches of length τ that only consists of outputs
(inputs) in the set Γy (Γu). For a vector x ∈ Rn, we denote
a generic norm, l2-norm and l1-norm of x by ‖x‖, ‖x‖2 and
‖x‖1.
2.2 System and Attack model
This work is concerned with the problem of state recon-
struction of LTI systems. We consider the scenario in which
sensors and actuators are both prone to adversarial attacks.
The ultimate goal is to reconstruct the state despite these at-
tacks. In this part, we define the attack model and conclude
this section with the precise problem statement. The system
S, is described by the following equations:
x(t +1) = Ax(t)+BuS(t),
yS(t) =Cx(t)+DuS(t). (6)
Without loss of generality we assume
[
BT DT
]T
to be of
full column rank.
System
Control Center
yS(t)
a(t)
y(t)
uS(t)
w(t)
u(t)
Fig. 1. The generic attack model considered in this paper.
Each actuator (sensor) corresponds to one input (output) and
we use input (output) instead of actuator (sensor) in the rest
of this paper. In this set up the adversary can attack both
inputs and outputs. We model these attacks by additive terms
and by imposing a sparsity constraint on them,{
uS(t) = u(t)+w(t),
y(t) = yS(t)+a(t),
(7)
where u(t) ∈ Rm and y(t) ∈ Rp are the controller-designed
input and the observed output, respectively, and w(t) ∈ Rm
and a(t)∈Rp are signals injected by the malicious agent. In
the rest of this paper, we refer to these signals (w(t) ,a(t))
as the attack of the adversarial agent. We use the subscript
S for signals that directly come from/to the system. The
controller can only observe y(t) and compute the input u(t).
This generic attack model is depicted in Figure 1.
When the adversary attacks an input (output) it can change
its value to any arbitrary number without explicitly revealing
its presence. The only limitation that we impose on the power
of the malicious agent is the maximal number of inputs and
outputs that can be attacked.
Assumption 1 (Bound on the number of attacks) The
number of inputs and outputs under attack are bounded by
r and s, respectively.
Therefore, the malicious agent can attack a subset of
inputs and outputs denoted by Γu ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and
Γy ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, 1 respectively, with |Γu| ≤ r and |Γy| ≤ s,
1 For ease of exposition, we use Γu to denote under-attack inputs
while using Γy for the set of attack-free outputs, i.e., the set of
under-attack outputs is represented by Γy := |{1, . . . , p}\Γy in this
paper.
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such that supp({w(t)}) ⊆ Γu and supp({a(t)}) ⊆ Γy. Note
that these sets are not known to the controller and only upper
bounds on their cardinality are given. Once the adversary
chooses these sets, inputs and outputs outside these sets re-
main attack-free. This assumption is realistic when the time
it takes for the adversarial agent to attack new inputs and
outputs is large compared to the time scale of the system.
We now precisely define the main problem we tackle in this
paper.
Problem 2 (Secure state estimation) For the linear sys-
tem defined by (6) under the attack model defined by (7),
what are necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the state of the compromised system (6) can be reconstructed
with bounded delay?
It is well-known that the secure state estimation problem,
when only outputs are under adversarial attacks, is combina-
torial and belongs to the class of NP-hard problems [31,35].
Therefore we are motivated to design an observer that har-
ness the complexity of this problem.
Problem 3 (Secure observer design) Assumming condi-
tions in Problem 2 are satsified, how can we design an
observer that reconstructs the state of the compromised
system?
3 Conditions for Secure State Estimation
In this section, we solve Problem 2, i.e., we provide con-
ditions on the system described by (6) under which state
reconstruction (with bounded delay) is possible. We first de-
velop the notion of sparse strong observability. This section
concludes with Theorem 8 that relates this notion to the so-
lution of Problem 2.
In the absence of attacks, the problem of estimating the state
of a system while some of the inputs are unknown has been
studied and the notion of strong observability was intro-
duced in the literature [16]. For strongly observable systems,
it is possible to estimate the state of the system without the
knowledge of inputs. The following definition formalizes
this concept.
Definition 4 (Strong observability) An LTI system is
called strongly observable if for any initial state x(0) ∈ Rn
and any input sequence {u(t) ∈ Rm}∞t=0 there exists an in-
teger τ ∈ N∪{0} such that x(0) can be uniquely recovered
from {y(t)}τt=0.
Note that τ is always upper-bounded by the order of the
system. Linearity implies the following lemma.
Lemma 5 An LTI system is strongly observable if and only
if y(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ N∪{0} implies that x(0) = 0.
PROOF. Please refer to Appendix.
It is straightforward to conclude the following corollary.
Corollary 6 An LTI system is not strongly observable if
and only if there exist a non-zero intial state and an input
sequence such that y(t) = 0 for t ∈ N∪{0}.
PROOF. Follows directly from Lemma 5.
It is well-understood that when the adversary is restricted
to attacking outputs, state reconstruction is possible only if
there is enough redundancy in the outputs of the system. This
redundancy can be stated in terms of observability of the
system while removing a number of outputs. This property
has been formalized in [11] and is called sparse observability
[36]. By analogy with sparse observability, we define the
notion of (r,s)-sparse strong observability as follows:
Definition 7 ((r,s)-sparse strong observability) An LTI
system (A,B,C,D) with m inputs and p outputs is (r,s)-
sparse strongly observable if for any Γu ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and
Γy ⊆ {1, . . . , p} with |Γu| ≤ r and |Γy| ≥ p− s, the system
(A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)) is strongly observable.
Note that in Definition 7, the value of r and s are upper
bounded by the number of inputs and outputs, respectively.
This modified notion of strong observability is the key for
formalizing redundancy across inputs and outputs. We show
that a necessary and sufficient condition for secure state es-
timation can be stated using this property. Note that (0,s)-
sparse strong observability is equivalent to the notion of s-
sparse observability that was introduced before in the liter-
ature [11, 23, 36]. The following theorem is the main theo-
retical result in this paper.
Theorem 8 Let the number of attacked inputs and outputs
be bounded by r and s, respectively. Under the attack model
(7), the state can be reconstructed (possibly with delay) if
and only if the underlying system is (2r,2s)-sparse strongly
observable.
Remark 9 It is worth mentioning that the maximum number
of attacked outputs, s, cannot be greater than
⌊ p
2
⌋
and it is
an inherent limitation of LTI systems with p outputs [11].
However the maximum number of attacked inputs is not
inherently restricted by
⌊m
2
⌋
and can take values up to m,
depending on the specific system under the consideration.
Remark 10 Pasqualetti et. al. [31] addressed the problem
of attack detection and identification in the presence of ad-
versarial inputs and outputs for continuous-time LTI sys-
tems. They showed that attack identification is possible if and
if for any Γu⊆{1, . . . ,m} and Γy⊆{1, . . . , p} with |Γu| ≤ 2r
and |Γy| ≥ p−2s, the system (A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)) does
not have any invariant zeros.
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It is clear that from the state and the dynamics of the sys-
tem, the attack can be identified, therefore the attack iden-
tification comes free with the solution to the secure estima-
tion problem. Strongly observable LTI systems do not have
any invariant zeros (see, for example Theorem 1.8 in [16]).
Therefore this theorem shows that under this sparse-attack
model, the conditions for identifying the attack also enable
one to reconstruct the state, i.e., characterizations of attack
identifiability and secure state estimation are equivalent for
LTI systems. Putting these together, secure state estimation
also comes with the solution to the attack identification prob-
lem. However, we provide a direct proof that does not re-
quire this machinery.
PROOF. First we show that (2r,2s)-sparse strong observ-
ability is a sufficient condition for correctly estimating the
state. For the sake of the contradiction, assume that the
state cannot be reconstructed, i.e., there exist two differ-
ent (initial) states, denoted by x(1) and x(2), that cannot
be distinguished under this attack model. More precisely,
there exist two attack strategies that will lead to the same
exact (observed) trajectories. We reserve superscripts .(1)
and .(2) for variables across those scenarios. Let us denote
the adversarial additive terms by {w(1)(t)},{a(1)(t)} and
{w(2)(t)},{a(2)(t)}. We represent the corresponding in-
puts and outputs of the system by {u(1)S (t)},{y(1)S (t)} and
{u(2)S (t)},{y(2)S (t)}, and the common (corrupted) measured
output and the controller input sequences are denoted by
{y(t)} and {u(t)}, respectively.
By the assumption of the attack model (7), there exist
Γ(i)u ,Γ
(i)
y for i ∈ {1,2} with bounded cardinality such that
supp({w(i)(t)})⊆ Γ(i)u ,supp({a(i)(t)})⊆ Γ(i)y , (8)
for i ∈ {1,2}. Note that{
u(1)S (t) = u(t)+w
(1)(t)
u(2)S (t) = u(t)+w
(2)(t)
, (9)
where u(t) is the controller designed input. Therefore
supp({u(1)S (t)−u(2)S (t)}) = supp({w(1)(t)−w(2)(t)})
⊆ Γ(1)u ∪Γ(2)u . (10)
Similarly, it is straightforward to conclude that supp({y(1)S (t)−
y(2)S (t)})⊆ Γ
(1)
y ∪Γ(2)y . We are ready to reach the contradic-
tion. The underlying system is LTI, thus the input sequence
{u(1)S (t)−u(2)S (t)} with the initial state x(1)− x(2) generates
the output sequence {y(1)S (t)−y(2)S (t)}. The underlying sys-
tem is (2r,2s)-sparse strongly observable so the sub-system
(A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)) is strongly observable for any
|Γu|= 2r and |Γy|= p−2s. Let us choose Γu and Γy as any
set of 2r inputs and p−2s outputs such that,
Γ(1)u ∪Γ(2)u ⊆ Γu, Γy ⊆ Γ(1)y ∩Γ(2)y . (11)
Note that {y(1)S (t)|Γy − y(2)S (t)|Γy} is a zero sequence, hence
by Lemma 5 we conclude that the corresponding initial
state (x(1)− x(2)) is zero, which contradicts the assumption
of x(1) 6= x(2). Now we prove that (2r,2s)-sparse strongly
observability is a necessary condition. For the sake of con-
tradiction, suppose that the system described by (6) is not
(2r,2s)-sparse strongly observable, however, reconstructing
the state (possibly with delays) is still possible. We con-
struct two system trajectories with different (initial) states
that have exactly the same input and output sequences under
suitable attack strategies (additive terms). This implies that
estimating the correct state is indeed impossible thereby
establishing the desired contradiction.
By the assumption of the contradiction, the underlying
system is not (2r,2s)-sparse strongly observable, so there
exist subsets of inputs and outputs denoted by Γu with
|Γu| = 2r and Γy with |Γy| = p− 2s, respectively, such
that (A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)) is not strongly observable.
Corollary 6 implies that there exist an initial condition ∆x
and an input sequence {∆u(t)} (with its support lying in-
side Γu) that generates an output sequence {∆y(t)} with
supp({∆y(t)}) ⊆ Γy. One can rewrite ∆u(t) and ∆y(t) as
sum of two sparse signals, more precisely:
∆u(t) = ∆u(1)(t)+∆u(2)(t), (12)
∆y(t) = ∆y(1)(t)+∆y(2)(t), (13)
where cardinality of supp({∆u(i)(t)}) and supp({∆y(i)(t)})
are upper-bounded by r and s for i∈ {1,2}, respectively. For
example, we can rewrite Γy = Γ
(1)
y ∪Γ(2)y where |Γ(i)y | ≤ s for
i ∈ {1,2}. Then we define
∆y
(i)(t)|
Γ(i)y
:= ∆y(t)|
Γ(i)
∆y(i)(t)|
Γ(i)y
:= 0
, for i ∈ {1,2}.
Now consider the following two different trajectories of the
system
{
u(1)S (t) = ∆u(t)
y(1)S (t) = ∆y(t)
,
{
u(2)S (t) = 0
y(2)S (t) = 0
(14)
with their initial states{
x(1)(0) = ∆x
x(2)(0) = 0
, (15)
5
and their corresponding attack strategies,{
w(1)(t) = ∆u(1)(t)
a(1)(t) =−∆y(1)(t) ,
{
w(2)(t) =−∆u(2)(t)
a(2)(t) = ∆y(2)(t)
. (16)
It is straightforward to verify that {y(1)(t)}= {y(2)(t)} and
{u(1)(t)} = {u(2)(t)}, i.e., under the attack model (7) the
controlled inputs and the observed outputs are exactly the
same for both trajectories while having different states,
therefore the proof is complete.
4 Secure Observer Design
In this section, we seek solutions to Problem 3. In the first
part, we explain the intuition behind the proposed algorithm
that estimates the state despite attacks on inputs and out-
puts. We give formal guarantees that the algorithm recon-
structs the state correctly. In the second part, we introduce
the observer by leveraging the SMT paradigm followed by
two methods that enhance the run time of state estimation.
Based on the attack model (7), the input to the system is de-
composed into two additive terms, the controller-designed
input u(t) and the adversarial input w(t). The underlying
system (6) is linear and therefore we can easily exclude the
effect of the controller-designed input from the output by
subtracting its effect. Hence, without loss of generality we
assume that the true u(t) is zero.
The proposed algorithm is based on the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 11 Suppose the underlying system is (2r,2s)-
sparse strongly observable, and the number of attacked in-
puts and outputs are bounded by r and s, respectively. Given
any subset of inputs and outputs denoted by Γu and Γy with
|Γu| ≤ r and |Γy| ≥ p− s, the first statement below implies
the second:
(1) There exist Uˆ ∈ Rn|T | and xˆ ∈ Rn such that
Y|Γy(t) = OΓy xˆ+NΓu→ΓyUˆ. (17)
(2) The estimated state xˆ, is equal to the actual state of
the system at time t−n+1, x(t−n+1), where n is the
order of the underlying system.
Remark 12 The underlying system is (2r,2s)-sparse
strongly observable therefore (A,B(.,Γu),C(Γy,.),D(Γy,Γu)) is
strongly observable. If (17) has a solution, then xˆ would be
the unique solution for x (see section III-B of [44]).
PROOF. Let us denote the set of attack-free outputs and
under-attack inputs by Γ∗y and Γ∗u. At most s outputs are
under attack, therefore |Γy∩Γ∗y | ≥ p−2s. Note that Y|Γy∩Γ∗y
can be written as follows:
Y|Γy∩Γ∗y =OΓy∩Γ∗y x(t−n+1)
+NΓu→Γy∩Γ∗y W|Γu +NΓ∗u\Γu→Γy∩Γ∗y W|Γ∗u\Γu . (18)
On the other hand, we can rewrite (17) by taking only outputs
in Γy∩Γ∗y ,
Y|Γy∩Γ∗y = OΓy∩Γ∗y xˆ+NΓu→Γy∩Γ∗y Uˆ+NΓ∗u\Γu→Γy∩Γ∗y 0,
(19)
where 0 is a zero vector with appropriate dimensions.
The underlying system is (2r,2s)-sparse strongly ob-
servable, therefore we conclude that the sub-system
Sˆ := (A,B(.,Γu∪Γ∗u),C(Γy∩Γ∗y ,.),D(Γy∩Γ∗y ,Γu∪Γ∗u)) is strongly ob-
servable. One can reinterpret both equations as two (possi-
bly different) valid trajectories of the system Sˆ that share
the same output sequence. Strong observability of Sˆ implies
that xˆ = x(t−n+1) which completes the proof.
The main algorithm in this paper builds upon this proposi-
tion. We search for a set of inputs and outputs that satisfies
equality (17), i.e., we check if there exist Uˆ and xˆ that make
equality (17) hold. Based on Proposition 11, we define a
consistency check as follows,
TEST 1 (Consistency Check) Given subsets of inputs and
outputs denoted by Γu and Γy, TEST(Γu,Γy) returns true if
min
Uˆ,xˆ
‖Y|Γy −OΓy xˆ−NΓu→Γy Uˆ‖ ≤ ε, (20)
where ε > 0 is the solver tolerance, due to numerical errors.
However, for the sake of clarity, we focus in this paper on
the case when ε is negligible 2 .
Finding the right subset of inputs and ouputs that satisfies
this test is a combinatorial problem in nature and requires
exhaustive search. It is well-known that secure state estima-
tion under this attack model is in general NP-hard [31, 35].
This test is depicted in Algorithm 2.
In the rest of this section, we introduce an architecture for
our observer followed by methods to improve its compu-
tational performance. For each input (output), we assign a
binary variable bi ∈ B (ci ∈ B) that indicates if the corre-
sponding input (output) is under attack or not, i.e., bi = 1
(ci = 1) if the ith input (output) is under attack. In the rest
of this paper, we use the bold letters (b and c) to denote
these Boolean variables and we reserve non-bold type face
(b and c) as instances of them. Finding the right assignment
of these Boolean variables is combinatorial in nature and in
order to efficiently decide which set of inputs and outputs
satisfies the TEST in (20), we design an observer using the
lazy SMT paradigm [4].
2 Note that the minimum always exists for (20) as the cost function
is a semi-definite quadratic function.
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4.1 Overall Architecture
The observer consists of two blocks that interact with each
other, a propositional satisfiability (SAT) solver and a the-
ory solver. The former reasons about the combination of
Boolean and pseudo-Boolean constraints and produces a fea-
sible instance of b ∈ Bm and c ∈ Bp, based on its current
state. The theory solver checks the consistency of Boolean
variables using the consistency test, and when the test fails,
it encodes the inconsistency as a pseudo-Boolean constraint
and returns it to the SAT solver. The general architecture is
depicted in Figure 2.
The initial pseudo-Boolean constraint only bounds the num-
ber of attacked inputs and outputs, i.e.,
ΦB := (
m
∑
i=1
bi ≤ r)
∧
(
p
∑
j=1
ci ≤ s). (21)
Initially, the SAT solver generates instances of b and c that
satisfy ΦB. The theory solver checks whether Γu := supp(b)
and Γy := supp(c) satisfies the consistency check. If the test
is satisfied, then the algorithm terminates and returns the
(delayed) estimate of the state. Otherwise, the theory solver
outputs UNSAT and generates a reason for the conflict, a
certificate, or a counterexample that is denoted by Φcert.
This counterexample encodes the inconsistency among the
chosen inputs and outputs. The following always constitutes
a naive certificate.
Φnaive-cert := ∑
i∈supp(b)
bi + ∑
j∈supp(c)
c j ≥ 1. (22)
On the next iteration, the SAT solver updates the constraint
by conjoining Φcert to ΦB, and generates another feasible
assignment for b and c. This procedure is repeated until the
theory solver returns SAT as illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Note that Proposition 11 implies that the SAT solver even-
tually produces an assignment that satisfies the consistency
test and therefore Algorithm 1 always terminates. The size
of the certificate plays an important role in the overall exe-
cution time of the algorithm [35]. Note that the attack model
considered in [35] is restricted to outputs, and the major
contribution of our work is to handle both input and output
attacks. In the next section, we focus on constructing shorter
counterexamples to improve the run time.
Algorithm 1. Secure state estimator
Require: A,B,C,D (system), Y (output), r,s (bounds)
1: status← UNSAT
2: Φcert← True
3: ΦB← ( ∑
i∈{1,...,m}
bi ≤ r)∧( ∑
i∈{1,...,p}
ci ≤ s)
4: while status = UNSAT do
5: ΦB←ΦB∧Φcert
6: (b,c)← SAT-solver(ΦB)
7: (status, x)← T-solver.check(supp(b),supp(c))
8: Φcert← T-solver.Certificate(supp(b),supp(c))
9: return (x,b,c)
Algorithm 2. T-solver.check
Require: Γu,Γy
1: Solve: (xˆ, Uˆ) = argminx,U‖Y|Γy −OΓyx−NΓu→ΓyU‖
2: if ‖Y|Γy −OΓy xˆ−NΓu→Γy Uˆ‖ ≤ ε then
3: status = SAT
4: else
5: status = UNSAT
6: return (status, xˆ)
4.2 SAT certificate
In this part, we improve the efficiency of Algorithm 1 by
constructing a shorter certificate (counter-example or con-
flicts). As it was discussed before, the naive certificate only
excludes the current assignment of b and c from the search
space of the SAT solver, however, by exploiting the struc-
ture of the underlying system, we show that we can further
decrease the size of the certificate and therefore prune the
search space more efficiently.
One of the main results of this paper is to show that we can
always find a smaller conflicting subset of inputs and out-
puts. We propose two methods for generating shorter certifi-
cates. The first method reduces the size of the counterexam-
ple by at least s−1, we explain this method in Lemma 13
and give a formal proof of the existence of such shorter cer-
tificate. In practice, however we observe the reduction in the
length of conflicts is much larger than this theoretical bound.
The second method is inspired by the QUICKXPLAIN al-
gorithm. This method generates counter-examples that are
irreducible, meaning that we cannot reduce the size of the
counter-example by removing some of it’s entries. We also
note that by generating multiple certificates at each iteration
we can further enhance the execution time. At the end of
this section Lemma 15 states that for a generic LTI system
the size of the certificate cannot be smaller than m+1.
Let us assume that the SAT solver hypothesized ΓSATu :=
supp(b) and ΓSATy := supp(c) as the set of compromised in-
puts and safe outputs, respectively. The main intuition behind
both methods is to look for Γcertu ⊇ ΓSATu and Γcerty ⊆ ΓSATy
that would not satisfy the consistency test. Note that the cer-
tificate consists of inputs in Γcertu and outputs in Γcerty .
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Algorithm 3. T-solver.Certificate 1
Require: ΓSATu ,ΓSATy
step 1: Conduct a linear search in the input set
1: Sort ΓSATu
2: status← UNSAT, j← /0,Γcertu ← ΓSATu
3: while status == UNSAT and |Γcertu |< 2r do
4: Γcertu ← Γcertu ∪{ j}
5: pick another input j ∈ ΓSATu
6: (status,x)← T-Solver.check(Γcertu ∪{ j},ΓSATy )
step 2: Conduct a linear search in the output set
7: Sort ΓSATy
8: Pick a subset of size p−2s: Γtempy ⊆ ΓSATy
9: status← SAT, i← /0
10: while status == SAT do
11: Γcerty ← Γtempy ∪{i}
12: (status,x)← T-Solver.check(Γcertu ,Γcerty )
13: Pick another output i ∈ ΓSATy \Γtempy
14: Φ1cert← ∑
j∈Γcertu
b j + ∑
i∈Γcerty
ci ≥ 1
15: return Φ1cert
4.3 Method I based on heuristics
Method I reduces the size of the certificate by increasing the
size of (supposedly under attack) inputs (Γcertu ) followed by
decreasing the size of (supposedly safe) outputs (Γcertu ). The
summary of the above procedure of shortening certificates
is illustrated in Algorithm 3. We begin by adding inputs to
ΓSATu while making sure TEST still returns false and the
number of inputs is bounded by 2r. Let us denote this new
set of inputs by Γcertu .
At the second step, we shrink the set of conflicting outputs
in order to further shorten the size of the counterexample.
Let us denote a subset of ΓSATy of size p−2s by Γtempy . The
following lemma shows we can reduce the size of conflicting
outputs at least by s−1.
Lemma 13 Assume that the system S is (2r,2s)-sparse
strongly observable, and the number of attacked inputs and
outputs are bounded by r and s, respectively. Pick any sub-
set of inputs and outputs denoted by Γcertu and ΓSATy with
|Γcertu | ≤ 2r and |ΓSATy | ≥ p−s, that do not satisfy the consis-
tency check (20). Given any subset of at most p−2s outputs
denoted by Γtempy ⊆ ΓSATy , one of the following is true:
(1) TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ) returns false,
(2) There exists an output i ∈ ΓSATy \ Γtempy such that
TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪{i}) returns false.
PROOF. Please refer to Appendix.
We denote this smaller set of conflicting outputs Γtempy (if
TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ) returns false, otherwise Γtempy ∪ {i}) by
Γcerty . Lemma 13 gives formal guarantees of the existence of
shorter certificates which hold no matter how the subsets of
inputs and outputs (Γtempu and Γtempy ) are chosen. This lemma
shows that Method I reduces the size of the certificate by at
least s−1.
In practice, we choose these subsets based on heuristics that
have for objective a decrease in the overall running time. We
assign slack variables to inputs and outputs similarly to [35]
and [37], and sort them based on the structure of the system.
Recall that Algorithm 3 shortens the certificate by reducing
the number of inputs followed by the reduction in the num-
ber of outputs, i.e., we simultaneously reducing both inputs
and outputs in the certificate. We observe that by generating
two counterexamples, we can prune the search space of the
SAT solver more efficiently. Similarly to Algorithm 5, we
can find two counterexamples by reducing the number of
inputs following a reduction in the number of outputs and
vice-verse.
Sorting ΓSATu and ΓSATy :
Assuming TEST(ΓSATu ,ΓSATy ) returns false, we assign slack
variables to inputs in ΓSATu and outputs in ΓSATy , denoted by
slacku( j) and slacky(i), respectively. Let us denote a solu-
tion to the optimization (20) inside TEST(ΓSATu ,ΓSATy ) by xˆ
and Uˆ.
We define slacku( j) for j ∈ ΓSATu as the norm of the pro-
jection of Y|ΓSATy −OΓSATy xˆ−NΓSATu →ΓSATy Uˆ onto the column
space of N j→ΓSATy ,
slacku( j) := (23)
‖N j→ΓSATy N
†
j→ΓSATy
(
Y|ΓSATy −OΓSATy xˆ−NΓSATu →ΓSATy Uˆ
)
‖.
This slack variable measures how much of the residual can
be justified by considering j in addition to ΓSATu . Note that
we want to append inputs to ΓSATu while having a false TEST.
We first normalize these slack variables by the norm of the
corresponding invertibility matrix, and ΓSATu is obtained by
sorting slack variables in ascending order.
We define slacky(i) as the residual of each output:
slacky(i) := ‖Y|i−Oixˆ−NΓSATu →{i}U‖, i ∈ Γ
SAT
y . (24)
Note that,
∑
i∈ΓSATu
slacky(i) = min
Uˆ,xˆ
‖Y|ΓSATy −OΓSATy xˆ−NΓSATu →ΓSATy Uˆ‖.
(25)
We first normalize each slack variable by the norm of the
corresponding observabality matrix. Recall that we aim to
find a smaller subset of ΓSATu while ensuring TEST returns
false. We pick the output with the highest slack variable as
the first element of ΓSATu . We sort the rest based on the di-
mension of the kernel of each observability matrix, follow-
ing the intuition provided in [35].
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4.4 Method II based on QuickXplain
The second method (Algorithm 5) is inspired by QUICK-
XPLAIN and generates a counter-example by pruning the
naive-certificate (22) to make it irreducible. We formally de-
fine this property as follows,
Definition 14 (Irreducible certificate) A certificate con-
sisting of inputs Γu and outputs Γy is irreducible, if no other
subset of it can generate a conflict, i.e., for all subsets de-
noted by Γ′u ⊆ Γu and Γ′y ⊆ Γy the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ′u and Γ′y generate a conflict.
(2) Γ′u = Γu and Γ′y = Γy.
One cannot prune irreducible certificates and each element
is necessary for the set to remain a counter-example. Let
∆SAT be the elements (consisting of inputs ΓSATu and out-
puts ΓSATy ) of the naive certificate. For ease of exposition
we slightly abuse notation to denote TEST(ΓSATu ,ΓSATy ) by
TEST(∆SAT). We denote the output of this algorithm by ∆cert
which consists of inputs Γcertu and outputs Γcerty .
This method consists of an exploration phase in which it
finds an element (input or output) that belongs to an irre-
ducible certificate. Let us denote an enumeration of ∆SAT by
e1, · · · ,ek, and the internal state by ∆temp← /0. This method
begins by adding step-by-step elements of ∆SAT to ∆temp.
The first element (ei ∈ ∆SAT) that fails TEST(∆temp) is part
of an irreducible certificate, and therefore is added to ∆cert.
In order to find further elements of this certificate, we keep
ei in the background and the first element that fails the con-
sistency check is added to ∆cert. This repeated process can
be implemented efficiently by using the divide and con-
quer paradigm as depicted in Algorithm 4. When an ele-
ment ei of ∆SAT is detected we divide the the remaining
elements into two disjoint subsets ∆1 := {e1, · · · ,e j} and
∆2 := {e j+1, · · · ,ei−1}. We can now recursively apply the
algorithm to find a conflict ∆2cert among ∆2 by keeping the
set ∆1 in the background and a conflict ∆1cert among ∆1 by
keeping the set ∆2cert in the background. This method of find-
ing an irreducible subset is depicted in Algorithm 4
Note that the resulting counter-example depends on the ini-
tial enumeration of elements in ∆SAT. If the all the inputs
(outputs) are ahead of outputs (inputs), then the resulting
counter-example mostly consists of inputs (outputs). In or-
der to have the maximal reduction in the search space of
the SAT solver at each iteration, we produce three certifi-
cate using this method, putting inputs first, outputs first and
mixing both inputs and outputs.
In the last part of this section, we look at the certificate size
for a generic LTI system. We observe that the certificate size
cannot be smaller that the number of inputs which is stated
formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 15 For a generic LTI system the size of the cer-
tificate is always lower bounded by m+ 1, where m is the
Algorithm 4. T-solver.QuickXplain
Require: ∆0cert,∆0
1: if T-solver.check(∆0cert) = UNSAT or ∆0 == /0 then
2: return /0
Let e1, · · · ,ek be an enumeration of ∆0
3: i← 0, ∆temp← ∆0cert,
4: while T-solver.check(∆temp) = SAT and i≤ k do
5: i← i+1
6: ∆temp← ∆temp∪ ei
7: ∆icert← ∆temp
8: ∆cert← ei, j← b i2c
9: ∆1←{e1, · · · ,e j}
10: ∆2←{e j+1, · · · ,ei−1}
11: ∆cert← ∆cert∪ T-solver.QuickXplain(∆ jcert∪∆cert,∆2)
12: ∆cert← ∆cert∪ T-solver.QuickXplain(∆0cert∪∆cert,∆1)
13: return ∆cert
Algorithm 5. T-solver.Certificate 2
Require: ΓSATu ,ΓSATy
1: ∆cert← T-solver.QuickXplain( /0,ΓSATu ∪ΓSATy )
2: Divide ∆cert to inputs Γ
cert
u and outputs Γcerty
3: Φ2cert← ∑
j∈Γcertu
b j + ∑
i∈Γcerty
ci ≥ 1
4: return Φ2cert
number of inputs.
PROOF. Please refer to Appendix.
5 Simulation Results
We implemented our SMT-based estimator in MATLAB
while interfacing with the SAT solver SAT4J [21] and
assessed its performance in two case studies, randomly
generated LTI systems and a chemical plant. We report the
overall running time by using the two proposed methods,
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 5.
5.1 Random Systems
We randomly generate systems with a fixed state dimension
(n = 40) and increase the number of inputs and outputs.
Each system is generated by drawing entries of (A,B,C,D)
according to uniform distribution, when necessary we scale
A to ensure that the spectral radius is close to one. In each
experiment, twenty percent of inputs and outputs are under
adversarial attacks, and we generate the support set for the
adversarial signals uniformly at random. Attack signals and
the initial states are drawn according to independent and
normally distributed random variables with zero mean and
unit variance. All the systems under experiment satisfy a
suitable sparse strong observability condition as described
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Fig. 4. Execution time of Algorithm 1 using Φ1cert, Φ2cert versus
the number of outputs (p) and inputs (m).
in Section 3.
Figures 3 and 4 report the results of the simulations, each
point represents the average of 20 experiments. All the ex-
periments run on an Intel Core i5 2.7GHz processor with
16GB of RAM. We verify the run-time improvement result-
ing from using the shorter certificates, Φ1cert and Φ2cert, com-
pared to the theoretical upper-bound of the brute-force ap-
proach in Figure 3. For instance, consider the scenario with
p = 24 and m = 10 in Figures 3 and 4. In the brute-force
approach, we require to check all
(24
4
) × (102 ) ≈ 4.8 ∗ 105
different combinations of inputs and outputs, however, by
exploiting either Φ1cert or Φ2cert we observe a substantial im-
provement. We observe that althoughΦ2cert gives a worse run
time for systems with smaller number of outputs, it scales
better compared to Φ1cert when the number of inputs and out-
puts grow.
5.2 Chemical Plant
In this part, we use the proposed observer to detect attacks on
inputs and outputs of a simplified version of the Tennessee
Eastman control challenge problem [9]. Ricker [32] derived
a continuous time LTI model of the plant interaction in its
steady state. This system consists of 4 control inputs and
10 measured outputs and the linearized model has 8 state
variables. The structure of the continuous-time dynamics is
reported below.
dx
dt
=

∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗

x+

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗

u,
y =

0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ ∗

x,
where ∗ represents a non-zero entry 3 , and x ∈ R8, u ∈ R4
and y ∈ R10 are state, input and output variables, respec-
tively. The only known limitation of this LTI model is the
system should operate close to its steady-state. We obtain
a discrete-time model by discretizing the continuous-time
model assuming a zero-order hold for the input u, with a
time-step of 5s. The attacker can read all the inputs and out-
puts and manipulate one control input and two measured
outputs. The linearized system is (2,4)-sparse strongly ob-
servable, therefore our observer can correctly reconstruct the
state under this attack model.
We randomly generate attack signals and the initial state
according to independent and normally distributed random
variables. The support set of attacks are drawn uniformly at
random, and in each experiment one input and two outputs
are under adversarial attacks.
The proposed observer in this paper can correctly recon-
struct the (delayed) state after 8 samples, and the average
performance of 20 experiments, by using Φ1cert and Φ2cert is
reported in Table 1. The overall execution time is the run
time of the observer after receiving all the required samples
from the plant, and it does not take the sampling time of the
plant into account. We observe that the execution time of
the observer to reconstruct the state and to detect attacks is
much smaller compared to the sampling time of the plant.
3 For the exact dynamics of the LTI model, see [32]
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Table 1
Average performance of the proposed observer
Overall execution time
Number of calls to
the SAT solver
Φ1cert 0.22s 20.05
Φ2cert 0.21s 7.95
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of secure state es-
timation when inputs and/or outputs are under adversarial
attacks. In this set-up, there is no restriction on how the ad-
versary manipulates inputs and outputs. By introducing the
notion of sparse strong observability, we derived necessary
and sufficient conditions under which state estimation is pos-
sible given bounds on the number of attacked outputs and
inputs. Furthermore, we demonstrated the scalability and ef-
fectiveness of the proposed estimator with numerical simu-
lations.
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PROOF. [Lemma 5] We first prove the sufficiency part. For
the sake of contradiction, suppose that the underlying sys-
tem is not strongly observable but the property of Corollary
5 is true. If the underlying system (6) is not strongly observ-
able, it means there exist two initial conditions, denoted by
x(1)(0) and x(2)(0) possibly with different input sequences
denoted by {u(1)(t)} and {u(2)(t)}, respectively, that corre-
spond to the same output sequence {y(t)}. The underlying
system is linear, therefore the nonzero initial condition of
x(1)(0)− x(2)(0) with the input sequence {u(1)(t)−u(2)(t)}
produces the zero output sequence which contradicts the
property given in Corollary 5. The necessity can be con-
cluded using the similar argument. For the sake of contra-
diction let us assume this property does not hold, i.e., there
exists a non zero initial state x(0) 6= 0 that corresponds to
the zero output sequence. This contradicts the strong observ-
ability since the zero output sequence can be generated from
both zero and x(0) 6= 0 as initial conditions under (possibly
different) input sequences.
PROOF. [Lemma 13] We prove this lemma with contradic-
tion. We show that if TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪{i}) returns true
for all i ∈ ΓSATy \Γtempy then TEST(Γcertu ,ΓSATy ) would also
return true, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma.
By applying the following lemma successively, the result
follows directly.
Lemma 16 Assume that the system S is (2r,2s)-sparse
strongly observable. Pick any subset of inputs and out-
puts denoted by Γcertu and Γ
temp
y with |Γcertu | ≤ 2r and
|Γtempy | ≥ p− 2s. Then for any subsets of outputs denoted
by Γ1y and Γ2y , the first statement implies the second:
(1) TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪Γ1y) and TEST(Γcertu ,Γtempy ∪Γ2y) re-
turn true.
(2) TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪Γ1y ∪Γ2y) returns true.
PROOF. Without loss and generality we can assume Γ1y , Γ2y
and Γtempy are all disjoint sets. Since TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪Γiy)
returns true for i ∈ {1,2}, therefore we haveY|Γtempy
Y|Γ1y
=
OΓtempy
OΓ1y
 xˆ1 +
NΓcertu →Γtempy
NΓcertu →Γ1y
 Uˆ1, (.1)
Y|Γtempy
Y|Γ2y
=
OΓtempy
OΓ2y
 xˆ2 +
NΓcertu →Γtempy
NΓcertu →Γ2y
 Uˆ2, (.2)
where xˆ1, xˆ2 ∈ Rn are states that T-solver.check returns,
Uˆ1, Uˆ2 are matrices with appropriate dimensions that satisfy
TEST. Note that the underlying system is (2r,2s)-sparse
strongly observable, |Γcertu | ≤ 2r and |Γtempy | ≥ p− s there-
fore Sˆ := (A,B(.,Γcertu ),C(Γtempy ,.),D(Γtempy ,Γcertu )) is strongly ob-
servable. One can reinterpret (Uˆ1,Y|Γtempy ) and (Uˆ
2,Y|Γtempy )
as two (possibly different) valid trajectories of a strongly
observable system Sˆ with identical output sequences. Strong
observability implies that the state can be uniquely deter-
mined from the output with a delay bounded by n, therefore
xˆ1 = xˆ2. Furthermore, the equality of right hand sides of
(.1) and (.2) implies that,
NΓcertu →Γtempy (Uˆ
2− Uˆ1) = 0, (.3)
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i.e., Uˆ2 − Uˆ1 is a zero dynamic of Sˆ. By (2r,2s)-sparse
strongly observablity of S, we conclude that Uˆ2− Uˆ1 is also
a zero dynamic of S, and therefore,
NΓcertu →Γ1y (Uˆ
2− Uˆ1) = 0, NΓcertu →Γ2y (Uˆ2− Uˆ1) = 0. (.4)
Putting (.1), (.2) and (.4) together with xˆ1 = xˆ2, we conclude
that:
Y|Γtempy
Y|Γ1y
Y|Γ2y
=

OΓtempy
OΓ1y
OΓ2y
 xˆ1 +

NΓcertu →Γtempy
NΓcertu →Γ1y
NΓcertu →Γ2y
 Uˆ1, (.5)
i.e., TEST(Γcertu ,Γ
temp
y ∪Γ1y ∪Γ2y) returns false.
PROOF. [Proof Sketch of Lemma 15] Let us revisit the op-
timization (20) inside the consistency check TEST(Γu,Γy),
min
xˆ,Uˆ
∥∥∥∥∥Y|Γy−[OΓy ,NΓu→Γy]
[
xˆ
Uˆ
]∥∥∥∥∥ (.6)
For a generic LTI system, the matrix
[
OΓy ,NΓu→Γy
]
∈
Rn|Γy|×n(1+|Γu|) is of full rank, where n is the order of the
LTI system. If
[
OΓy ,NΓu→Γy
]
∈ Rn|Γy|×n(1+|Γu|) is of full
row rank, then TEST(Γu,Γy) is satisfied irrespectively of
the actual values of Y|Γy . Therefore in order to have a
certificate constructed by inputs in Γu and outputs in Γy,[
OΓy ,NΓu→Γy
]
∈ Rn|Γy|×n(1+|Γu|) should be a full column
rank matrix, therefore
n|Γy| ≥ n(1+ |Γu|). (.7)
The certificate consists of inputs in Γu and outputs in Γy,
therefore the length of certificate is:
|Γu|+ |Γy|= m−|Γu|+ |Γy| ≥ m+1. (.8)
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